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Both Argued January 15,1985
ISSUES
Most commercial flights arrive at their destinations
safely. Unfortunately, when an accident does occur, the
physical, emotional and economic damages may be
enormous. These two cases, argued in succession on the
same day, will require the United States Supreme Court
to interpriet two international agreements relating to air
carriage. [The agreements involved are the Convention
for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Interna-
tional Transportation by Air (hereafter the Warsaw
Convention) and the Agreement Relating to Liability
Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague
Protocol (hereafter the Montreal Agreement)]. In Air
France v. Saks, the Court must determine whether a
person injured on an airplane may recover under these
international agreements although nothing unusual
happened during the airplane's inflight operation. In
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahfoud, the issue is whether the
$75,000 maximum recovery for injuries suffered in in-
ternational air transport set forth in the Montreal
Agreement include prejudgment interest damages.
FACTS AND BACKGROUND
The Warsaw Convention is an international treaty
among 120 nations (including the United States) en-
tered into in 1929. The convention contemplates among
other things the liability of air carriers in international
aviation. Due to the Warsaw Convention's liability award
ceiling ($8,300.00), the United States fostered in 1966
the development of a private agreement among interna-
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tional air carriers (the Montreal Agreement) which set a
maximum liability for accidents in air transportation at
$75,000 per person. In addition, the air carriers surren-
dered their right to assert paragraph 20.1 of the Warsaw
Convention which states: "[T]he carrier shall not be
liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all
necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was
impossible for him or them to take such measures."
AIR FRANCE V. SAKS
Since Saks is an appeal of a summary judgment deci-
sion, all facts must be accepted as alleged. Saks was a
passenger on an Air France flight from Paris, France to
Los Angeles, California. She alleges that she totally lost
her hearing in one ear as a result of the change in cabin
pressure upon the airplane's descent to land in Los
Angeles. Air France alleges that the operation of the
airplane, including the programmed depressurization,
was normal in all respects.
The Warsaw Convention states that: "[T]he carrier
shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily
injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which
caused the damage thus sustained took place on board
the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of
the embarking or disembarking." (Article 17; emphasis
added). The Supreme Court must determine whether
Saks' injuries were sustained by an "accident" as the
term appears in the Warsaw Convention. Does the word
accident mean an occurrence while on the airplane or
does it mean some unusual or unexpected occurrence?
In interpreting the Warsaw Convention, the Court
must also examine the relevance of the Montreal
Agreement of 1966. The Montreal Agreement modified
the terms of the Warsaw Convention in two respects.
First, the Montreal Agreement increased the maximum
liability of air carriers as stated in the Warsaw Conven-
tion from $8,300.00 to $75,000. In addition, the air
carriers agreed not to utilize paragraph 20.1 of the
Warsaw Convention as a defense for claims of injuries
suffered on board the airplane.
Saks states that Air France is liable for her injuries
occurring inflight. She argues that since Air France
cannot argue paragraph 20.1, it is precluded from chal-
lenging her claim that the injury was caused by a flight-
related accident. Finally, she asserts that a failure to
include occurrences which happen in the normal course
of air transport under the term "accident" would unrea-
sonably shield air carriers from liability.
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Air France declares that it is not within the intent of
the Warsaw Convention as modified by the Montreal
Agreement to make the carrier "the absolute insurer of
its passengers' health." It asserts that there is ample
proof to establish that the word "accident" was chosen to
require the passenger to show an abnormal occurrence
in the air carriage for the carrier to be liable.
This action commenced in state court and was re-
moved to the United States District Court. The district
court concluded that an ear injury caused by normal
cabin pressurization changes does not constitute an "ac-
cident" covered by the convention and therefore issued
a summaryjudgment order.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed the summary judgment order. The
Ninth Circuit imposed absolute liability on airlines for
injuries caused by air travel. It held that showing a
malfunction or abnormality in the aircraft's operation is
not a prerequisite for liability under the Warsaw Con-
vention.
EASTERN AIR LINES, INC. V. MAHFOUD
In Malifoud, the Supreme Court is again asked to
interpret provisions of the Warsaw Convention and the
Montreal Agreement. Here, the issue is whether the
damage recovery limitation of $75,000 denies recovery
in excess of that amount if pre and postjudgment inter-
est is awarded to the plaintiff. The $75,000 maximum
recovery set forth in the Montreal Agreement permits
only one specific exception. If the law of a state permits
a court to separate legal fees and court costs from the
rest of the plaintiff's recovery, the maximum liability is
set at $58,000 plus such legal fees and costs.
Bernard and Odile Mahfoud, decedents of Robert F.
Mahfoud, were on Eastern Airlines' Flight 66 from New
Orleans, Louisiana to New York City (John F. Kennedy
International Airport) enroute to Paris, France on June
24, 1975. Flight 66 was caught in a "windshear" and
crashed just prior to landing at Kennedy Airport. The
Mahfouds and many other passengers were killed in the
accident. Since Flight 66 was the first leg of an interna-
tional journey for the Mahfouds, the provisions of the
Warsaw Convention and Montreal Agreement were ap-
plicable to the claims on their behalf. As noted below,
due to the procedural assertions of Eastern Airlines,
Robert F. Mahfoud was denied recovery on behalf of the
decedents until December 2, 1982. By that time, East-
ern's accumulated interest on the unpaid amount was
over 50% of the total amount recovered (prior to inter-
est) by Mahfoud.
Mahfoud asserts that to permit Eastern to delay the
payment of its maximum liability through dilatory pro-
cedural tactics, and yet not pay the interest awarded,
effectively denies the plaintiff the full value of the ap-
propriate recovery. In addition, the Montreal
Agreement provides for the payment of greater
amounts as long as such payments are no greater than
$75,000 in dollars valued at the time of injury. He ar-
gues that this constitutes an acceptance of interest
amounts greater than the $75,000 maximum recovery.
Eastern asserts that the Montreal Agreement con-
templates no exception from the maximum except
where legal fees and court costs are ordered separately.
Where separate legal fees and court costs are ordered,
the maximum is reduced to $58,000 plus the fees and
costs.
In addition, Eastern states that the $75,000 maxi-
mum was negotiated down from $100,000 in exchange
for the agreement not to assert paragraph 20.1 of the
Warsaw Convention. Eastern argues that to increase the
maximum for interest would eliminate the fruits of the
negotiation.
The judicial history of the Malifoud case is serpen-
tine. Mahfoud's original action against Eastern was filed
in 1975 in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana. This action was
transferred to the Eastern District of New York in 1976
and consolidated with other claims related to flight 66.
A summary judgment was entered in the Eastern
District of New York against Eastern Air Lines, Inc. in
1978. The decision was reversed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on procedural
grounds in 1980. Ultimately, the case was transferred
back to the Western District of Louisiana. In November,
1982, Eastern was held liable for the injuries to the
Mahfouds. The district court also concluded that Robert
F. Mahfoud was entitled to recover prejudgment and
postjudgment interest from Eastern over and above the
$75,000 limit on liability at the rate established by the
Louisiana Civil Code. The court reasoned that the Mon-
treal Agreement contemplated prompt recovery from
an air carrier by a passenger or passenger's estate and
that it is unconscionable to let an airline delay litigation
to an extent that a smaller amount of money may be
invested to pay a $75,000 claim. On December 2, 1982,
Eastern deposited $150,000 (2 x $75,000) with the dis-
trict court.
Eastern appealed the award of prejudgment interest
in excess of the $75,000 limit of liability to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. While this
appeal was pending, the Fifth Circuit held in Domangue
v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. that both prejudgment and
postjudgment interest might be awarded over and above
the $75,000 limit of liability. Citing Domangue, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court in
Mahfoud. The Domangue court based its ruling on two
objectives embodied in the Montreal Agreement. The
first objective was to increase the limit of liability. This
was achieved by the increase in liability to a maximum of
$75,000. An important additional objective was to en-
courage the speedy disposition of claims. Having identi-
fied these objectives, the court of appeals then sought to
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balance the objectives of maintaining a fixed and defi-
nite level of liability against the objectives of speedy
compensation and maximum recovery, for injured par-
ties or their survivors.
The court of appeals struck the balance in favor of
allowing the payment of postjudgment interest above
and beyond the $75,000 limit to liability established by
the Montreal Agreement. The court held that awards of
postjudgment interest would encourage the payment of
judgments when the victim or survivors most need help
and that by referring to legal rates of interest or paying
the principal amount into the registry of the court or an
escrow account, the air carriers would still be provided
with a definite basis for determining their liability.
Moreover, since the Montreal Agreement expressly pro-
vides for including legal fees and costs in the $75,000
limit, the failure of the drafters of the agreement to
specifically include interest in the limit suggests that it is
proper to award postjudgment interest. The Domangue
court held prejudgment interest warranted the same
treatment.
SIGNIFICANCE
Both Mahfoud and Saks require the United States
Supreme Court to address the meaning and intent of
these agreements. Although the cases are far from glam-
orous, their effect on the traveling public may be
substantihi. The result in Saks may be that air carriers
will be held to be responsible virtually prima facie for
damages that occur in the air. Coversely, a finding for
Air France may burden the passenger with proving that
something out of the ordinary occurred on the flight in
order to recover.
In Malfoud, a decision to permit air carriers to delay
paying liability claims, thereby lessening the real effect
of the damage award may encourage such practices. By
contrast, a decision in support of Mahfoud may foster
prompt payment of major claims.
The future effect of these cases could become vi-
tiated if the Warsaw Convention and Montreal
Agreement are modified to define the term "accident"
and state whether pre and post judgment interest shall
be included in the $75,000 ceiling. Of course, this does
not mean our courts will surrender their right to analyze
those provisions in future cases.
ARGUMENTS
For Air France (Counsel of Record, Stephen C. Johnson, Two
Embarcadero Center, San Francisco, CA 94111; telephone (415)
421-4600)
1. The decision below disregards the language of the
convention by redefining "accident" as "occurrence."
2. The Montreal Agreement does not alter the meaning
of Article 17 nor make air carriers insurers of their
passengers' health.
3. The Third Circuit's definition of "accident" gives
effect to the language of the convention and is not a
negligence-based standard.
For Valerie Saks (Counsel of Record, Daniel U. Smith, P. 0.
Box 278, Kentfield, CA 94914; telephone (415) 461-5630)
1. The decision below properly permitted Saks to re-
cover under the Warsaw Convention for her total and
permanent hearing loss proximately caused by the
change in cabin pressurization during descent.
2. Under the Montreal Agreement, international air-
lines are liable for all damages proximately caused by
operating the aircraft.
3. The Warsaw Convention should be interpreted in
light of its history and in light of improvements in
aviation safety since 1929.
4. Air France cannot invoke the limitation of "accident"
because the ticket advice to passengers under the
Montreal Agreement does not limit airline liability to
"accident."
5. Apart from the interpretation of the Warsaw Con-
vention, it was proper to reverse the summary judg-
ment against Saks.
AMICUS BRIEF
In Support ofAir France
The International Air Transport Association, an or-
ganization of 135 international air carriers, filed a brief
arguing that the court of appeals misread the language
of the convention and of the agreement with its absolut-
ist construction; international air carriers are liable only
for passenger injuries which are caused by an accident.
For Eastern Air Lines, Inc. Counsel of Record, Richard M.
Sharp, 1800 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC
20036; telephone (202) 828-2000)
1. The plain language of the Warsaw Convention and
the Montreal Agreement precludes an award of pre-
judgment interest over and above the carrier's limit of
liability.
2. An award of prejudgment interest over and above the
carrier's limit of liability is inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the convention and the agreement.
3. The plain language and purposes of the convention
and agreement cannot be overridden by the equitable
considerations relied on by the courts below.
For Robert F. Mahfoud (Counsel of Record, George E.
Ferrell, 1216 Sixteenth Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036;
telephone (202) 833-2005)
1. The award of prejudgment interest is inconsistent
with the purposes of the Warsaw Convention and
Montreal Agreement.
2. The convention and agreement permit awarding pre-
judgment interest as reimbursement for delay.
AMICUS BRIEF
In Support of Robert F. Mahfoud
This amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of the
surviving family members or personal representatives of
deceased passengers who were killed while engaged in
international travel on various airlines.
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